This article explores chieftaincy in democratic South Africa and particularly in KwaZuluNatal, where traditional leadership is particularly vocal and politically embedded.
Introduction
Late Twentieth Century efforts to promote democracy in Africa were rewarded in one part of the continent at least. Flying in the face of the voice of Afro-pessimism, the first non-racial elections in South Africa in April 1994 heralded the end of apartheid and gave birth to a liberal democracy. They have been succeeded by two further democratic elections that have been inclusive, relatively free, fair and peaceful. This historic period of change has been accompanied in South Africa by what Oomen has described as a 'surprise re-entry' and 'resurgence' of traditional leadership, 2 a view that chimes with wider observation of 're-traditionalisation' across Africa. 3 In this context, it could be argued that South Africa has become caught up in a wider drift towards revitalised tradition and the increased salience of customary practices, despite its fairly recent democratic transition. This should not be particularly surprising, however, given that South Africa is as rich in tenacious institutions with indigenous roots as other African countries and indeed, these were entrenched (albeit in distorted ways) over many decades of segregationist and apartheid rule. Moreover, if viewed in historical perspective, traditional authorities in Southern Africa have always engaged assertively with other sites of authority and forms of government. 4 It is somewhat more surprising that South Africa's new democracy, led by an African National Congress (ANC) government, would adopt such a conciliatory approach towards chieftaincy in South Africa, even at the expense of hard won liberal democratic principles. Adherents of tradition argue that though now tainted by its association with segregation and apartheid, traditional leaders have nevertheless provided continuity of governance, particularly in rural areas where there were scant alternative structures. Opponents see the political embracing of tradition as a regressive step that undermines progress towards democratic consolidation in South Africa. In many respects these concerns and perspectives are not new and reflect a longstanding historiography in South Africa focused on chieftaincy and governance that is particularly relevant in informing and understanding the contemporary period.
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Against this background we explore the institution of chieftaincy 6 in South Africa and particularly in KwaZulu-Natal, where 'resurgent' tradition is particularly vocal and politically embedded. However, even here it is argued that the relationship between ubukhosi (chieftaincy) and wider governance structures must be seen as part of a longer history, exhibiting both continuities and discontinuities. 7 With this in mind we consider whether the current recognition of traditional authorities and the powers and functions accorded them, constitute a threat to South Africa's emergent democracy or serve as a site of stability in a politically volatile province that could potentially destabilize South Africa's fragile democracy. The question is framed by recourse to institutional theories and is answered by setting the contemporary experience of 'negotiating tradition' in KwaZulu-Natal against a background of segregation, apartheid, resistance and political violence in the province. . 6 It is recognized that the terminology around traditional leaders is contentious and that the use of terms such as traditional authorities and chiefs have been questioned and debated in South Africa. In KZN the vernacular Zulu terms inkosi (chief) and amakhosi (chiefs) are used. The Zulu term for the institution of chieftainship is ubukhosi. When the discussion is not focused exclusively on KwaZulu-Natal the terms traditional leaders and chiefs are used interchangeably, here stripped of pejorative connotations. 3
Background on KwaZulu-Natal
Forged out of the former Province of Natal and the so-called 'independent homeland' of KwaZulu, the Province of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) has had a difficult history, including being born of a political conflict during the twilight years of apartheid that assumed the proportions of a civil war. The price paid in the province for the transition to a non-racial national democracy was the loss of 20,000 lives since 1984. former ruling Nationalist Party for a federalist system of government and although they lost on this score, he tried to ensure greater power for the province of KZN through preserving the powers of traditional authorities, a critical element of his IFP support base.
In the first non-racial democratic elections in a government of national unity in 1994 the IFP won a narrow majority in the new provincial legislature and KZN became one of only two provinces to fall outside the control of the ANC. 12 In the 1999 elections, neither party won a clear majority and a coalition provincial government was formed on the back of a shaky truce. Floor crossing in the Provincial Legislature subsequently rocked political calm. 13 This allowed the ANC and its allies in the province to secure a two-seat majority so that for the first time the political dominance of the IFP in KZN was dislodged, unleashing a backlash from the Party involving accusations of bribery and corruption against those who defected to the ANC. 14 In the 2004 elections the ANC won a narrow majority (46.98%) over the IFP (36.82%) but neither party appears able to make up an alliance bloc. 15 Despite the elections having been declared free and fair, the IFP challenged the results and the prospect of an inclusive and cooperative coalition government in the province cannot be guaranteed.
Critical to the delicate power balance between the ANC and the IFP in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature in the first decade of democracy was the fact that each party received its votes from predominantly urban and rural constituencies respectively. The IFP has its major power base in the rural areas and commands strong support from the amakhosi (chiefs) and their izinduna (headmen). It has nurtured an urban following through alliances with white middle-class elites in the cities, notably 12 The other was Western Cape Province. In 1994 nine provinces were created out of the four provinces of so-called 'white South Africa' and the ten former ethnically defined 'homelands' or 'bantustans' created under the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951 and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act in 1959. 13 This was provoked by changes in national legislation allowing incumbent elected politicians to switch party allegiances mid-term. The legislation was designed by the ANC led national government to address in its favour, problems being encountered at local government level in the Western Cape but the situation in KZN could not be excluded from this legislation although the implications are more ambiguous. 14 At the time it led to the firing of three ANC Nkonyeni as sounding the voice of modernist reason. Another approach and the one adopted here, is to be wary of such bifurcated analysis in favour of seeking to understand how processes of transformation occur within circumstances of institutional multiplicity.
Institutions are understood here as the humanly devised rules that constrain or enable individual and collective behaviour. They comprise formal rules, informal constraints and the enforcement characteristics of both.
17 New institutional economists consider institutions to be efficient because they enhance information flows and reduce uncertainty and durable because of their inherent inertia, given the high transactions costs of change. 18 Alongside other social scientists they accept that institutions affect all aspects of social existence from political decision making to the rules governing personal relationships and that they form the framework in which these social interactions take place. 19 Like culture, institutions are not static but they are inherently inert. Configured by past processes and circumstances they are never in full accord with the requirements of the present. 20 The anthropologist, Mary Douglas sees institutions becoming socially embedded slowly, by way of iterative cognitive processes. 21 Giddens also takes a long view, describing the rooting of institutions in terms of social systems understood as the 'reproduced relations between actors or collectivities, organized as regular social practices'. 22 What this might suggest with regard to the acrimonious exchange between
Prince Gideon Zulu and Peggy Nkonyeni in the KwaZulu Legislative Assembly is that if they engaged for long enough, eventually one frame of meaning might give way to the other. However, taking the long view does not necessarily imply passivity. Robert Bates suggests that political interventions and settlements can play an important role in the creation of new or the evolution of old institutions. 23 This article considers both the tenacity and mutability of the institution of ubukhosi, from the colonial period, through the apartheid era and into the post-apartheid dispensation in South Africa. It explores how this has been engaged with as a political process within KZN past and present, in order to explain how today, democratically elected members of the national and provincial parliaments and ward councillors, operate in a context of institutional multiplicity alongside chiefs and headmen and to analyse the implications for democratic consolidation.
Chieftaincy as an Evolving Institution
One of the key problems facing South Africa is that chieftaincy in Africa operates on principles that are antithetical to democratic ideals. Selection for the office of chief is not rights to households); and social and cultural coherence and continuity (by playing a key role in social and ritual aspects of tribal life).
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To a considerable degree, these remain the core responsibilities of the amkhosi in KZN to the present day. However, this is by way of a sometime turbulent history that changed the texture, if not the basic functions of ubukhosi, for even in the pre-colonial era chieftaincy or traditional authority was not unchanging. more conciliatory stance towards traditional leaders. This was because they fitted into its vision of 'separate development'. However, as Govan Mbeki concluded on the role of chiefs under apartheid, they served as 'baas boys' putting on trial and convicting in 'bush courts' those who fell foul of the regime's regulations. 32 As a result of this history, in much of the country traditional authorities became estranged from their people as they became increasingly indebted to the apartheid government, leading to their declining legitimacy and popularity.
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In present day KwaZulu-Natal traditional leadership was tightly intermeshed with the Bantustan system. Inkosi Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, in addition to being premier of the self-governing territory of KwaZulu, was himself a traditional leader. 34 In order to fully understand the struggle over ubukhosi within the broader polity of KwaZulu-Natal, however, it is important to recognise that historically, as in the present, Buthelezi and the IFP have not always had exclusive purchase on the institution. Why on the eve of achieving its largest electoral victory ever did the ANC put at risk the principles of democracy for which it fought so hard and which are enshrined in the Constitution, by rushing through legislation that entrenches the power of hereditary and exclusively male traditional authorities? The answer lies in recognition by the ANC of the electoral influence of chieftaincy. 47 In accounting for this we can recall that it was following disgruntled traditional leaders in the usually pro-ANC Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA) threatening to dissuade their subjects from 
Ubukhosi in the 'New' KwaZulu-Natal
The amakhosi and their izinduna in KwaZulu-Natal continue to occupy a particularly ambiguous position in the province's institutional landscape. This is because in addition to their electoral influence, some of them played a critical role in fostering or perpetuating the political violence that plagued the province during the transition from apartheid. While the civil war in KwaZulu and Natal was primarily an urban war, especially in the early stages, it was fuelled from the countryside, where the amakhosi and their izinduna, most of whom gave their allegiance to Inkatha, called on the inhabitants of their areas to fight and attack the militant youth in the city's townships. As Kentridge has explained, they were able to 'exact their traditional rights from farmers and homesteaders in the form of military duty'. They did so in return for favours 'ranging from land allocation to the issuing of licences' which though not a legal obligation was 'a difficult summons to resist nonetheless'. (Pretoria, 2001) . 59 These traditional authority areas formerly fell under the Ilembe Regional Council, a transitional governance structure that had been set up after the 1996 local government elections to cover the peri-urban area lying between the cities of Durban and Pietermaritzburg. The tribal authority areas, characterized by communal land tenure arrangements, were formerly administered by the KwaZulu homeland government, which failed to develop them. 60 It was set up under the Municipal Demarcation Act (Act No. 27 of 1998) and reduced the number of municipalities from 843 to 284 (Goodenough, Traditional Leaders, p. 40). The intention was in part to engineer an element of redistribution across former white and black areas but some commentators claim that there were gerrymandering motivations involved as well, to ensure that Durban remained firmly in the hands of the ANC. because of the relatively greater experience with local level democracy in cities than in the countryside. A question that arises is whether the institution of ubukhosi might evolve or mutate through its encounter with more democratic institutions of governance.
The peripheral boundaries of eThekwini were a source of profound political tension between the ANC and the IFP because they traversed tribal authority areas.
Initially the amakhosi in Greater Durban did not want to be part of the demarcation process and negotiations with them were difficult, not least because some of the new municipal boundaries cut right across former rural districts and tribal authority land.
Another early bone of contention was over the perceived lack of consultation with the amakhosi during the demarcation process and a perceived threat as to the future of are geared towards supporting various projects, especially for peri-urban and tourism development. In the battle for the hearts and minds of eThekwini's amakhosi, the City is seeking to deliver to traditional authority with capital investment to the tune of R200 million in the next planning phase. 65 As such eThekwini Metro has thrown down the gauntlet to the amakhosi and they are being encouraged to earn the right to represent their people by accommodating themselves to democratic processes and outcomes in the context of development practice and city governance. There is evidence to suggest that investment and development is leading some among the amakhosi to question whether their loyalties are better served by engagement with the city rather than with the IFP and the Province. 66 It may well be that the deliberate channeling of resources to eThekwini Municipality's traditional authority areas is designed to win political favour in IFP supporting areas, rather than to win the chieftaincy over towards democratic metropolitan governance. Nevertheless, the demonstration effect of development for democracy is leading non-participating traditional authorities to ponder where their future best lies.
Furthermore, our interviews with amakhosi suggest that opposition or passive resistance is in some quarters turning to grudging and even enthusiastic acceptance.
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It is too soon to tell whether this is a unidirectional and sustainable trajectory in the province's largest city, let alone whether it will resonate across rural KwaZulu-Natal.
Even in eThekwini there is suspicion on the part of some of the amakhosi over arrangements for their representation, understandable given that arrangements for their To the extent that they engage in pluralistic institutional arrangements, it has been very much in response to carrots rather than sticks. Moreover, the knot of bureaucratic and socially embedded institutions is tightly entangled in the administration and politics of the province, even in urban areas. As such, simple dichotomies such as 'citizen and subject' 72 do not really apply to this region, historically but more especially in presentday KwaZulu-Natal.
While institutions are resistant to change, and nowhere is this in greater evidence than KwaZulu-Natal, they can and do evolve. Moreover, as Bates has argued, we often underestimate the extent to which political interventions and settlements can create new or lead to the evolution of old institutions. 73 Under colonialism, segregation and apartheid, the institution of ubukhosi while dogged changed significantly. By the same token, the In such contexts, which admittedly remain fairly limited at present, it appears possible that the institution of chieftaincy could bring its remarkable attributes of solidity and cohesion to bear on democratic governance in South Africa, becoming a site for political stability in South Africa without undermining the hard-won rights of citizens. 74 Beall, Mkhize and Vawda, 'Navigating Tradition'; Beall, 'Exit, Voice and Tradition'.
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However, to the extent that ubukhosi remains a political football and given that to date the mounting concessions towards the amakhosi have occurred at the expense of citizens, notably women, then chieftaincy seems set to remain a faultline running through South
African democracy for sometime to come. Institutions can be left to simply evolve and mutate and it might be argued that the demonstration effect of successful development for cooperating amakhosi is one way of hastening this process along. Nevertheless, a question remains as to whether this will be too protracted a process for the safeguarding of South Africa's democracy, especially its commitment to gender equality and human rights.
What ultimately becomes 'rational' to individuals and normative in society is shaped by the diffusion of cultural values and practices through institutions in all their forms. 75 However, as Whitehead and Tsikata have argued with regard to women in Africa, 'the answer is democratic reform and state accountability, particularly with respect to women's political interests and voices, not a flight into the customary'. 76 In
South Africa this requires a conscious political challenge to the persistence (as opposed to the 'resurgence') of hierarchical and patriarchal institutions and practices associated with chieftaincy, although it is its very persistence that makes this politically difficult this is to achieve: this and the intermeshing of social, political and administrative institutions, particularly in KwaZulu-Natal. Nevertheless, if the fragile stability of South Africa's nascent democracy is to be maintained, much depends on the resolve of the ANC not to
give into the more pedantic demands of traditional leaders in the interests of political expediency. This is essential because ultimately a democratic polity is predicated upon a democratic society. The latter cannot be forged at the ballot box and cannot be achieved without respect for and the equal participation of all citizens.
